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INTRODUCTION
"You're putting an end to romance; it'll have a chilling effect on
courtship and flirting in Israel," bemoaned Knesset members to the lo-
cal media.' "It" referred to the legislative proposal for a comprehensive
sexual harassment prevention law. "You" referred to Parliament Mem-
ber ("MK") Yael Dayan (Labor), the Chairwoman of the Knesset's
Committee on the of Status of Women. Yet condemnations aside, on
March 10, 1998, the Israeli Parliament passed the proposal with only
one dissenter, after relatively tame second and third readings. The final
draft broadened the scope and the jurisdiction of sexual harassment be-
yond its traditional focus in the workplace or in exploitative relations of
authority.
Today, Israel boasts an extraordinary law, billed as one of, if not
the most, progressive laws of its kind in the world. The new law pro-
vides wider protection and holds greater potential for social change than
any existing laws in the United States, Canada, and most European na-
tions.
Educating individual MKs-whose party ideology ranged from
enlightened liberalism to Zionism and religious fundamentalism-
about sexual harassment to enable the passage of the law was no easy
feat. The philosophical underpinning, as embodied in the law's purpose,
the specific provisions (including protection against sexual harassment
based on sexual orientation), the less than optimal experience of similar
laws abroad (particularly in the United States), and the far-reaching so-
cial revolution hidden between the lines all comprised the launching
pad. Next came the daunting task of pushing the private legislation
through Committee and into the required three readings to pass the law
by a parliamentary coalition of right-wing conservatives, orthodox re-
ligious groups, fervent Zionists, and equality fighters.2
1. Legislative Proposal on the Prevention of Sexual Harrassment-1998, Second and
Third Reading, The 189th Meeting of the 14th Knesset (1998), http:II
www.knesset.gov.il/tql/markHOOOlO54.html [hereinafter Legislative History]
(quoting Yael Dayan, member of parliament, who was paraphrasing MKS comments
to the press in reaction to the legislative proposal).
2. Several MKs with strong party and religious ideology led the discussion and debate in
Committee. The 14th Knesset, elected in 1996, sported a "national coalition" and an
opposition "peace camp."
The Right-wing Likud-Tsomet bloc led the fragile coalition government which
included 3 ultra orthodox and religious parties (Shas, 10 seats; National religious
Party, 9 seats; United Torah Judaism, 4 seats). Other coalition members included the
Russian immigrant party (Yisrael Ba-Aliya, 7 seats) and the Third way (7 seats), a
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As with any successfiul legislative proposal, timing is paramount.
Yet, for an issue such as sexual harassment in an essentially Mediterra-
nean, "macho" society, where people hum (and a MK mentioned in the
hearing) a popular song titled, "When you say no, what is it you mean?"
timing is nearly irrelevant.' This paper purports to uncover the path to
the affirmative vote by tracing the pre-legislation social and legal status
quo (Parts I & II), including the emerging need for such a law that
made the timing opportune.
Discussion of the newly enacted law will outline the theoretical
underpinnings and their effect on the resultant version (Part III), fol-
lowed by the legislative history, including the Knesset and the public
debate surrounding the bill (Part IV), and the impact of that debate on
the final outcome of the law (Part V). Part VI will pay particular atten-
tion to the innovative approach of the law as a whole and some of the
revolutionary specific provisions within. In particular, the legislative
framework will be considered in the context of a nation founded and
conducted on traditional religious tenets of Judaism. Finally, an analysis
of the implementation and implication of the law will encompass socio-
cultural factors, feasibility, and potential impact (Part VII).
I. BACKGROUND: THE SociAL STATISTICS
AND ASSOCIATED COSTS
While the 1998 Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law ("PSH")
employs gender-neutral language, its purpose and origin are derived
from a mounting need to safeguard women's autonomy, dignity and
equal opportunity. In Israel, as in the rest of the world, women are the
primary targets of sexual harassment.4 The multitude of international
studies investigating the phenomenon focus mainly on harassment in
party created to cling to the Golan. The Gesher party withdrew from the coalition in
January 1998. The pro-settler Moledet (2 seats) supported the coalition from outside.
The peace camp was a relatively solid amalgamation of Labor (34 seats) and
parties to the left, such as Meretz (9 seats), a left-liberal party seeking to reduce the
role of religion in civic affairs, and the two Arab parties (The Arab democratic Party-
United Arab List (4 seats)). Hadash and the National Democratic Alliance supplied
another 5 seats to the opposition. Divide and Multiply, ECONoMIsT, Apr. 25, 1998,
at 58; see also Israek Key Indicators, June 1998, QuEsT ECONOMICS DATABASE.
3. Legislative History, supra note 1.
4. Israel Women's Network, Sexual Harassment-The Scope and Characteristics of the
Phenomenon [hereinafter IWN-SH] (a 1998 Legal Department memorandum citing
numerous international surveys of sexual harassment data) (unpublished manuscript
on file with author).
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the context of labor relations.5 Admittedly, the cost of sexual harassment
is difficult to measure and consequently few studies, if any, have ade-
quately assessed the full impact of the problem. Israeli researchers
conducted only a few surveys on the domestic scope of the phenome-
non.' Nonetheless, this handful of studies successfully established a
pattern of harassment sufficient to alert lawmakers to the personal and
social costs of sexual harassment.7
General surveys reveal that between a third and a half of working
women suffer from some form of sexual harassment during the course
of their working years.8 A comprehensive study of harassment in the
civil service revealed that 34% of the women surveyed encountered un-
welcome verbal sexual harassment, nearly 33% reported unwelcome
physical contact, and 10% recounted pressure to participate in joint
outings.9 In another study of professionals, 52% of women have been
exposed to unwelcome physical contact, 48% to sexual innuendoes,
38% to indecent proposals of a sexual nature, and 4% to pornographic
pictures.' °
Little quantified data exists outside of the employment context.
Between 1995 and 1997, Haifa University conducted one of the few
surveys of sexual harassment in educational institutions. Of the sampled
5. IWN-SH, supra note 4
6. See IWN-SH, supra note 4.
7. MKs with initial trepidations about the bill were persuaded to support it when they
were informed about the extent of sexual harassment in Israel. General surveys found
that as many as half of Israeli women say they have been harassed, and three-quarters
of them were afraid to complain or were convinced it would do no good. Larry
Derfner, Flirting With Disaster, THE JERUSALEM PosT, Mar. 13, 1998, at 17 (quoting
Rachel Benziman, legal advisor at the Israel Women's Network).
8. Rachel Benziman, Sexual Harassment at the Workplace, in WOMEN'S STATUS IN IS-
RAEu LAW AND Socimrv 318, at 323 (F. Raday, C. Shalev & M. Liban-Kooby eds.,
1995).
9. IWN-SH, supra note 4 (citing the Status of Women, No. 16, Nov. 1987)
(publication of the Office of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Status of Women).
"Joint outings" refers to extracurricular activities with officemates and superiors. The
study also revealed that 21% (of the 34% subjected to verbal sexual harassment) en-
countered such behavior at least once a week. On a more recent, though less
comprehensive, study of the civil service, 27% of the women surveyed reported expo-
sure to verbal sexual harassment, 16.4% reported sexual proposals, 2.7% recounted
use of threats for sexual favors and 7.7% experienced at least one sexual assault. See
IWN-SH, supra note 4 (citing Adia Pinto, Examination of Correlation Between Ac-
tual and Subjective Estimation of Sexual Harassment, at 54 (1989) (unpublished
master's thesis (Tel Aviv University). Verbal harassment included sexual innuendoes
or suggestive remarks.
10. Women in Israel-Information & Data, IWN (1997), at 47. Note that the term
"white collar" was translated as "professional."
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students, 67.7% reported sexual harassment by another student and
56.2% by an instructor. Although the bulk of harassment was verbal,
8% of students suffered a sexual assault by another student and 2% by
an instructor.
11
While sexual harassment is also prevalent in Israel's military, the Is-
rael Defense Forces ("IDF") only recently began collecting data on the
scope of the phenomenon." For the first time in 1995, the army started
to keep statistics on sexual harassment complaints. 3 Two years later, the
first instruction manual dealing with sexual harassment was circulated
among IDF commanders, and a hotline for complaints was estab-
lished.14
Recent statistics reveal a 43% jump in indictments for sexual har-
assment offenses between 1997 and 1998.15 Higher rates of indictment
are attributed to the slowly growing willingness to report such incidents.
In 1997, 280 women soldiers filed sexual harassment complaints, a 20%
increase from 1996 figures. 16 Actual incidence of harassment is believed
to be higher than reported, 7 as many soldiers fear retaliation, worsened
conditions, or dismissive attitudes as a result of filing grievances.
Given the scope of the phenomenon, the social costs that flow
from pervasive sexual harassment are noteworthy. Sexual harassment
sports an expensive price tag; the cost translates into damaging
implications for the individuals involved and to women (as the
predominant target) in general. Supporters of the proposed PSH law
argued that whether in the workplace, the university, or the army, sexual
harassment perpetuates the inferior social status quo of women. 8
Drawing on international and domestic social research, the bill's
proponents cited the phenomenon as responsible for deterring women
from entering male-dominated professions, the lack of promotions
11. IWN-SH, supra note 4 (citing Press Release, University of Haifa, May 18, 1997, at 1,
4).
12. Benziman, supra note 8.
13. The IDF launched the project as a result of pressure led by MK Naomi Chazan.
Louise Lief, Second Class in the Israeli Military: Women are Fighting for Equality in the
Ranks, US NEws & WORLD REPORT, May 22, 1995, at 47.
14. Amir Rappoport, Instructional Manual to Commanders: Don't Hint, Don't Touch,
YEDIOT -IAHRONOT, Mar. 10, 1997, at 9. "
15. Gideon Alon, More News in Brief Harassment Oifnses in Anny Rise 43%, HAARET Jan.
20, 1999, http://ww3. haaretz.co.il/eng/scri... ment&mador=1&se--true&datee=2/26/99;
16. Gideon Alon, IDF Sees Upswing in Sexual Harassment, HA ' iz, Jan. 8, 1998
http://www3.haaretz.co.illenglscri.. .ment&mador= l&se=true&datee=2126/99.
17. Sarah Friedman, Starting January 97 Hotline Catering to Sexually Harassed Women
Soldiers, MA'rTv, Nov. 13, 1997, A430.
18. IWN-SH, supra note 4.
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within existing frameworks, and the inability to completely fulfill
personal and economic capabilities and goals.'9
Studies of sexual harassment in the workplace supported these con-
cerns. For example, nearly a third of the sexually harassed women in
Israel reported an adverse effect on their working conditions or respon-
sibilities." The most common result of harassment wa the creation of a
hostile working environment in which working relations and coopera-
tion with colleagues and supervisors suffered substantially.2 A
significant percentage of those harassed experienced a reduction in their
job responsibility or were transferred to another position, often not
22
comparable to their previous status.
Apart from the individual social and economic harm, supporters of
the PSH bill pointed to losses incurred by employers. Decreased pro-
ductivity and high employee turnover were cited as examples of
inefficient and costly sources of lost profit to firms and government em-
ployers.23 In addition, legal fees and compensation to victorious
claimants provide further incentives to employers to prevent harass-
ment. For instance, a Tel Aviv labor court recently awarded NIS
100,000 for emotional and financial harm to an office manager who
was fired for refusing to comply with sexual demands. 2 While meager
in American terms ($24,242),25 such an award is considered substantial
by Israeli legal standards, especially in the context of sexual harass-
26
ment.
The social costs compound the individual economic, mental and
physical harm. The consequences of sexual harassment translate into
revenue loss to employers from reduced productivity, legal fees and
compensation, and damage to the company's reputation, as well as on-
going impediments to the advancement of women's social and
economic status. The disparate impact on women as the group most
affected by sexual harassment and the adverse effects of such conduct
19. IWN-SH, supra note 4 (citing HAZAEL HOUGHTON-JAMEs, SEXUAL HARASSMaNT 6,
at 29, 30 (London, 1995)).
20. Benziman, supra note 8, at 324.
21. IWN-SH, supra note 4.
22. IWN-SH, supra note 4.
23. IWN-SH, supra note 4.
24. Plonit v. Ploni, 3/836, Municipal Labor Court of Tel Aviv (opinion not yet pub-
lished). NIS is the currency used in Israel (New Israel Shekel).
25. Number reflects currency conversion rates as of Feb. 22, 2001.
26. Orit Kamir, Rethinking Sexual Harassment in Terms of Human Dignity-Respect, 29
MISHPATIM, July 1998, at 324.
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prompted one of the grounds on which the law was later justified-that
of sex discrimination and the aim for gender equality.27
II. THE OLD STATUS QUO: STATUTORY AND LEGAL DEFICIENCIES
A. Sexual Harassment: The Available Law Pre-1998
Explicit protection against sexual harassment first appeared in Is-
raeli law in 1988.28 Proscribed conduct was narrowly defined and
restricted solely to the employment context. It was not until ten years
later that the new sexual harassment law expanded the meaning of sex-
ual harassment to include all non-domestic relationships.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Law ("EEO") of 1988 in-
cluded a provision on "sexual harassment" which prohibited employers
from mistreating employees (limited to a list of circumstances) who
have refused or objected to propositions or acts of a sexual nature at-
tempted by the employer or supervisor.29 Such protection was afforded
only in the areas listed: hiring, work conditions, promotions, training
and professional development, firing, or compensation for dismissal."
The EEO provision, however, failed to define sexual harassment
beyond its characterization of unwelcome "propositions or acts of a
sexual nature.""' While the legislature interpreted "propositions of a
sexual nature" to include requests for sexual contact or going out on
dates, it provided no guidance in defining "acts of a sexual nature."
32
Consequently, lawyers, left with the task of statutory interpretation,
struggled to construct a definition for "harassment" that would include
both physical and verbal "conduct."33 As drafted, the provision omits
verbal harassment, such as comments about persons' sexual ability and
27. See discussion infra Part III.
28. The Israeli Penal Code proscribes acts that may also double as sexual harassment
(though not framed as such), including indecent suggestions, nonconsensual sex, as-
sault, rape, abuse of employment position, bribery, and blackmail by threats. Rachel
Benziman "Sexual Harassment at the Workplace" IWN, Employee Rights material
[hereinafter IWN-employee rights] (Copy on file with author).
29. Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 1988, S.H. 38.
30. Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 1988, S.H. Provision 2.
31. Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 1988, S.H. Provision 7.
32. Benziman, supra note 8, at 332.
33. The approach to define "acts" as behavior sought to impose a broad definition on the
provision. This means that verbal as well as non-verbal actions, allusions, suggestive
behaviors, etc. would also qualify as sexual harassment.
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experience or speculation about their bodies.m Additionally, no mention
is made of non-verbal behavior, such as notes, photographs or drawings
of a sexual nature targeting specific employees. As a result, some of the
more common forms of sexual harassment reported in academic studies
of the phenomenon were excluded from protection under the EEO, the
only pre-1998 law that explicitly addressed sexual harassment. 5
Next, the law required that the proposition or act be unwelcome. 6
Injury to the employee, then, had to be a result of the employee's rejec-
tion of the harassment. Successful claimants had to prove their active
refusal, which required that the harasser received clear notice about the
unwanted acts. A causation link had to be established between the re-
buke of the harassment by the target and the harm (in terms of
prescribed employment-related benefits) sustained. More specifically, a
claimant carried the burden of proof to show the causation link between
her refusal to date her supervisor and her lack of promotion."37
Since the provision only forbade the "result" or "outcome" of such
refusals, the legal construct failed to independently prohibit acts of
harassment or threats of harassment not resulting in employment-
related discrimination.38 Employer responsibility and liability were
likewise restricted only to the outcome of the harassment, not the actual
behavior. In the same vein, the law contained no guidelines for
employers' responsibility to provide either protection against
harassment by other employees or to establish a uniform grievance
procedure. 9
Under the 1988 EEO law, employees could receive economic
compensation for financial loss due to the discrimination by the em-
ployer-harasser. In some cases, the court could award damages for non-
pecuniary harm. As prescribed, the civil penalty for sexual harassment
was double the fine for invasion of privacy. The resultant criminal of-
fense of sexual harassment yielded up to one-year imprisonment.' °
34. Benziman, supra note 8, at 332.
35. Benziman, supra note 8, at 333. Benziman also cites an Israeli study in which thirty-
four percent of female employees encountered suggestive verbal behavior at least once
a week. Benziman, supra note 8, at n.61.
36. Benziman, supra note 8, at 333.
37. Benziman, supra note 8, at 337.
38. Benziman, supra note 8, at 333.
39. Benziman, supra note 8, at 336.
40. Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 1988, S.H., Provision 15.
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B. Deficiencies of the Existing Law
Prior to the 1998 PSH law, Israeli women enjoyed virtually no
protection against sexual harassment in the army, in academic settings,
or in the workplace. 4' In the decade following its inception, the EEO
law, as a prohibition on retaliation for rebuffed sexual advances, was
characterized as a "dead letter."" Many critics proclaimed the law as
ineffective in protecting employees from harassment. While employees
declined to make use of the available legal recourse, the incidence of
sexual harassment did not decrease. 3 Furthermore, the few complaints
filed failed to produce any meanin~fid decisions on sexual harassment in
the context of the 1988 EEO law.W
The old law's shortcomings fall along two main interdependent
lines: 1) broad inadequacies in understanding the social harm of sexual
harassment as a phenomenon, a misperception shared by legislators,
judges and the public at large; and 2) legal technicalities and definitions
that either hindered or made impractical filing and successfully resolv-
ing cases. Since the 1998 Sexual Harassment Prevention law attempts to
combat both strands, it is important to examine the pre-existing defi-
ciencies that motivated the legislation of the new law.
1. Conceptual Deficiencies
Prior to the new legislation, sexual harassment was confined solely
to the workplace and focused on the effects, rather than the actual phe-
nomenon and prevention of sexual harassment.45 Even though broad
definitions of sexual harassment were considered by legislators seeking
to deal with the problem, only narrow terminology was actually
adopted, as reflected in the 1988 EEO law. The reluctance to institute a
sweeping approach was attributed to the inability of the legislators to
41. Sue Fishkoff, The Status of Women in Israel Myth vs. Reality, NA'AmT: WOMEN
MAGAZINE, at http:/Iwww.naamat.org/magazine/myth.html (last visited Dec. 19,
2000).
42. Kamir, supra note 26, at 369.
43. Kamir, supra note 26, at 369-370.
44. Benziman, supra note 8, at 338. One estimate reported twenty to thirty sexual har-
assment cases have been filed. Kamir, supra note 26, at 369 n.120. The rare
exceptions include several Labor courts decisions in 1997 and a landmark decision by
the Supreme Court in 1998, which has adopted the broad definition of sexual har-
assment suggested in the then still pending proposed sexual harassment law.
45. Benziman, supra note 8.
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conceptualize sexual harassment as an issue of equality and discrimina-
tion.
Equality, as a fundamental social and legal construct, never gar-
nered legislative consensus. While briefly mentioned in the Declaration
of Independence,47 equality is not constitutionally mandated." Even in
the absence of a written constitution, the value of equality has not
gained the statutory status of a Basic Law.49 The 1951 Equal Opportu-
nities for Women law itself does not guarantee complete equal rights, as
it forbids equality in the personal status realm.5"
By barring sexual harassment in the context of an "Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Law," legislators attributed the phenomenon to a
type of sex discrimination.5 However, that understanding was limited,
not only in scope but also in practice. Not only was the 1988 EEO law
exclusive to the employment sphere, it overlooked the broader negative
implications of sexual harassment. Fundamentally, the EEO law failed
to grasp the detrimental impact of sexual harassment on women and
society in general. Far beyond the specific incidents of sexual harass-
ment, early legislative attempts disregarded critiques that sexual
harassment reinforced women's subordinate or inferior position in soci-
ety and bolstered the damaging image of women as objects for sexual
gratification.52
46. Kamir, supra note 26, at 370-73.
47. Declaration of Independence, (Declaration on the Establishment of the State of Is-
rael), 1 L.S.I. 3 (1948). "[Israel will] foster the development of the country for the
benefit of all its inhabitants;... [to] ensure complete equality of social and political
rights to all its inhabitants, irrespective ofreligion, race, or sex." (Emphasis added.)
48. Kamir, supra note 26, at 373.
49. Israel lacks a written constitution, but the series of legislated Basic Laws are designed
to eventually be codified into such a document. The Basic Law: Human Dignity &
Freedom, passed in 1992 is one of few fundamental laws of principle rights. 1992
S.H. 150. See generally INTRODUrON To THE LAW OF ISRAEL (A. Shapira ed. 1995).
50. Id. at 373. "Personal status law, derived directly from religious and cultural tradi-
tions, often governs the domestic sphere in areas of marriage, divorce and
maintenance, child custody, and in some cases, inheritance." Paula Abrams, Reserva-
tions About Women: Population Policy and Reproductive Rights, 29 CORNELL INT'L LJ.
1, 30 (1996). In Israel personal status matters are generally adjudicated by the relig-
ious courts.
51. American influence on Israeli legislators is apparent, not only from the title of the
first law dealing with sexual harassment akin to that of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission ("EEOC"), their underlying theories align as well. Both
legislated frameworks derive from an understanding of sexual harassment as a form of
discrimination, namely that based on sex.
52. See Benziman, supra note 8, at 320 (drawing on CA. Macinnon, Sexual Harass-
ment of Working Women (Yale University Press, 1979).
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Instead of mounting a multi-front strategy to combat harassment,
Israeli legislators confined recourse and remedy to improper behavior in
the workplace and to relations between employers and their subordi-
nates. Thus, sexual harassment was only prohibited under the EEO,
which dealt exclusively with limited instances within the domain of la-
bor relations.53
A notable remedial deficiency under Israeli law was the exclusion of
suits based on "hostile work environment," a well-established ground
under American sex discrimination law, because such harassment does
not result in economic loss.54 As detailed in the EEO's Provisions 2 and
7, sexual harassment referred only to matters directly relating to finan-
cial loss from the job, such as prejudicial treatment in hiring,
promotion, training, and firing." That is, only in situations in which
the employee had directly lost job stature due to refusal of sexual ad-
vances, in a quid pro uo manner, would she be entitled to legally
object to her treatment. By including only material loss, legislators cre-
ated a limited system for recourse.
In sum, the old law failed to proscribe the conduct itself, but rather
prohibited the discriminatory outcome of the harassment, and then only
if due to a specific job-related loss. Additionally, legislators created no
provisions for the prevention of sexual harassment, including imposing
a responsibility on employers to provide an environment free from sex
discrimination. By failing to fully grasp sexual harassment as discrimi-
natory behavior which must in itself be eradicated, drafters of the 1988
EEO law produced a systematically ineffective law that provided little
recourse or remedy. In reality, the law contributed little to ensure true
"equal opportunity" in the job market, educational institutions, or in
the military.
53. The Law and the Limits of Harassment, HA'RaaTz, Mar. 13, 1998, http://
www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/scri.. .ent&mador=3&se=true&datee-12/24/98.
54. The Law and the Limits of Harassment, supra note 53. Sexual harassment law under
the EEO provides for two types of claims. One is based on quid pro quo theory in
which an employer (or other employee) requires sexual favors in exchange for job-
related benefits. The other revolves around the "hostile environment" concept in
which the general circumstances create an unpleasant work environment which affect
the employees' work.
55. Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 1988, S.H.
56. Benziman, supra note 8, at 334 n.65.
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2. Statutory Inadequacies
Essentially, the 1988 EEO law lacked any specific definition of
sexual harassment. The prohibition against the conduct has likewise
been criticized for narrow construction. As mentioned previously, the
proscribed harassment could only transpire in relation to work-related
discrimination in hiring, promotion, training, work conditions, and
firing. Yet, even the potentially broad "work conditions" provision has
been narrowly interpreted by the Labor courts,57 effectively precluding
any hostile environment-based sexual harassment suit.
Commonly read, the prohibition against sexual harassment disre-
garded harassment by other employees (i.e. harassers who are neither
employers nor supervisors). The law also precluded recourse to workers
who felt coerced to comply with unwelcome sexual demands. Another
excluded group of victims included workers who suffered harm not
solely due to the harassment, or who did not experience actual demo-
tion or deterioration in their work-related circumstances.58 Thus, the
existing narrow definition of unacceptable conduct and employer re-
sponsibility barred recourse and remedy to many workers who were
subjected to sexual harassment.
The 1988 EEO legislation did not require employers to promul-
gate guidelines regarding prevention and remedy for sexual harassment
in the workplace. While this indicated to employers that they bear no
responsibility for harassment by employees, the omission also cut in the
reverse. Employers have successfully prevailed in most sexual harassment
lawsuits simply by arguing that they "have gone the extra mile" by in-
stituting prevention and grievance policies which were followed.59 In
other words, the lack of statute-based obligations allowed employers to
circumvent liability for sexual harassment by hiding behind the shield of
procedural fairness.
The burden of proof presented another statutory hurdle to accessi-
ble legal recourse. Placing the burden of proof on the target of
harassment often proved an impossible task. In order to create the link
between rejection of "come-ons" and an employee not receiving a pro-
motion or training opportunity, the petitioner had to have access to
information and materials available only to the employer. Thus, the
burden of proof made proving discrimination near impossible. Advo-
57. Benziman, supra note 8, at 335 n.65.
58. IWN-employee rights, supra note 28.
59. IWN-employce rights, supra note 28.
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cates for revision of the 1988 EEO law argued that the burden of proof
should be transferred to the employer who has primary access to the
relevant material evidence."° That is, the employer would need to show
that the reason for the lack of promotion, for example, was not a result
of the petitioner's refusal to comply with the employer's or supervisor's
sexual requests.61
Hoping to correct some of the 1988 EEO's deficiencies, legislators
attempted to fundamentally overhaul the law by enacting a revised
EEO. The new regulations were designed to provide the old law with
litigious "teeth."62 Under these requirements, once the petitioner shows
she refused or denied the sexual advances of an employer or supervisor,
the burden of proof shifted to the employer to show that no discrimi-
nation occurred. Employers, however, continued to successfully rebuff
claims by arguing that privately instituted sexual harassment guidelines
had been followed.63
Another innovation of the law broadened standing to include not
only the victim or a representative labor organization, but also pre-
existing bodies that work to advance protected groups' rights. Under the
revised EEO, civil and social advocacy organizations (such as consumer
rights or women's groups) have standing to sue employers on behalf of
sexually harassed employees. Even these innovations, however, failed to
encourage employees harmed by sexual harassment to bring suit against
their employers, as only a few cases were ever filed under the revised
law. "
The proposed sexual harassment prevention legislation was also de-
signed to tackle the existing inadequacies in the statutory law and case
interpretation. Drafters sought to specify proscribed behavior and pro-
hibit sexual harassment in itself, not just the associated work-related
harms. Women, they hoped, would be able to complain about sexual
harassment, sexual exploitation and deprecatory treatment without fear
and within the framework of regular, permanent procedures, regardless
of whether an authority relationship existed.65
60. Benziman, supra note 8, at 337.
61. Benziman, supra note 8, at 337.
62. Kamir, supra note 26, at 370.
63. Benziman, supra note 8, at 337.
64. Kamir, supra note 26, at 370.
65. The Law and the Limits ofHarassment, supra note 53, at 18.
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III. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS TO THE 1998 LAw
Whereas many countries with sexual harassment laws justify them
.... 66
on the grounds of sex discrimination, Israel adopted a broader theo-
retical justification. Israeli legislators expanded both the sweep of sexual
harassment law and its purpose and emphasized local norms and tradi-
tions to bolster the legal foundation. Proponents of the law devised a
culturally-sensitive theoretical construction in order to persuade the
conservative-dominated Knesset of the expansive statute's significance.
Instead of importing wholesale established justifications based on sex
discrimination, which underlie American sexual harassment law, the
Israeli drafters built on existing Basic Laws to "anchor" the revolution-
ary law in accepted values and norms.
The preamble to the proposal stated that sexual harassment is a
common and difficult social phenomenon which damages fundamental
social values, including dignity, liberty, privacy and equality. 7 MKs
pushing for the law cleverly drew on the Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty, to gather support for the law. Since the concept of equality
is neither enshrined in a basic law's nor widely accepted socially,69
proponents chose to emphasize the harm to human dignity and liberty,
rather than attempt to argue for a predominantly equality-based statute.
As stipulated in the preamble to the 1998 proposal, sexual harass-
ment was depicted as a humiliating and devaluing experience to one's
66. SExUAL HARASSMENT INTERNATIONAL, Sexual Harassment at the Work P/ace-Part
Two, EIRR, Jan. 1998, at 25. In Finland, Luxembourg and the U.K., for example,
sexual harassment claims can be brought under sex-discrimination legislation. In
contrast, French legislation defines sexual harassment in terms of an abuse of power.
Id.
67. Preamble, Legislative Proposal: Prevention of Sexual Harassment, 1997 H.H. 2641,
at 484.
68. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. A popular example for entrenched ine-
quality in Israel is the "Law of Return," which confers immigrant benefits, including
automatic citizenship only to Jews. In contrast, one of the first laws passed in Israel
was the Equal Opportunities for Women-1 951. The law, while inapplicable in per-
sonal status issues, guarantees equal rights for women in all legal actions. Only a few
equality laws exist, including Equal Wages Laws for Men and Women-1996, and
Equal Employment Opportunity law, first adopted in 1981; and Equal Retirement
Age Law-1987.
The equality laws mentioned deal solely with work-related issues, not general
protection in areas that most directly affect women's personal lives, such as marriage
and divorce. In addition, what is problematic is the lack of acceptance for the concept
of equality as a broad societal goal, rather than as only applicable in carefully deline-
ated circumstances. Kamir, supra note 26, at 362 n.105.
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humanity by being treated as a sexual object for the use of another per-
son." The preamble continued, stating that such treatment abrogates a
person's right of autonomy over one's body and sexuality, damages the
right to self definition and invades one's privacy.7' Finally, drafters
linked the degradation to dignity resulting from sexual harassment to
the notion of equality. The preamble connects the two concepts: "the
sexual harassment of women humiliates them in relation to their sexu-
ality and hinders their ability to enter the work force and other areas of
life as equal members, and as such hurts their equality."72
A strong emphasis on "anchored" values in Israeli society-i.e.
dignity, liberty and privacy-emerged from the proposal, and the sur-
rounding debates. Dignity and liberty, as prescribed in the 1992 Basic
Law with that title, represent central building blocks in the Israeli judi-
cial system, as well as important "cultural ethos."73 Professor Kamir,
who played a dominant role in drafting the law, argued that basing the
law on these values over the equality value would be more appropriate
for Israeli society.74 According to Kamir, dignity and liberty as values
find representations in many aspects of Israeli society; in the independ-
ence of a young country, the victory for "Jewish dignity" humiliated and
persecuted in the Diaspora and in particular during the Holocaust, and
the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern notions of "honor" adopted by
the new generations of sabras (Jews born in Israel)."
The drafters adopted Professor Kamir's argument that reliance on
the "dignity and liberty" values would prove the most efficient and per-
suasive line to the diverse, though predominately conservative Knesset.
Indeed, during the second and third hearing discussions in Committee,
parliament members asserted their support for the law to be based on
honor and respect to human liberty and dignity. The sentiment was
evoked by MKs ranging from the Zionist visionary party, Moledet,76 to
the ultra religious United Torah Judaism, to Likud,77 to the socially
70. Preamble, Legislative Proposal Prevention of Sexual Harassment, 1997 H.H. 2641,
at 484.
71. Preamble, Legislative Proposal: Prevention of Sexual Harassfnent, 1997 H.H. 2641.
72. Preamble, Legislative Proposal: Prevention of Sexual Harassment, 1997 H.H. 2641,
at 484.
73. Kamir, supra note 26, at 375.
74. Kamir, supra note 26, at 375.
75. Kamir, supra note 26, at 374-375.
76. See infra note 85; see also Legislative History, supra note 1, at 18.
77. Reuven Rivlin (Likud-Gesher-Tzoemt) reasserts the law aims to address situation in
which one person degrades another. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 12.
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progressive Meretz and Chadash (the Democratic Front for Peace and
Equality).7"
Employing the accepted values of dignity and liberty and the asso-
ciated rights of privacy and autonomy, the proposal's advocates
succeeded in winning over a skeptical public and an initially jeering
Parliament. Even so, the turn-around of public sentiment was no easy
feat. By couching sexual harassment in terms of humiliation and degra-
dation to one's self respect and ability to make personal decisions,
promoters of the law launched a triumphant public education cam-
paign.
Early comments by MKs to the media chided the law as the death
knell of romance, courting and flirting.79 Skeptical politicians painted
extreme scenarios in which they claimed the free Mediterranean culture
of flirting, founded on espousing compliments, would be criminalized
with the signing of the law. Older men would be prevented from em-
bracing a young female student or soldier in "fatherly concern"" for fear
of judicial reprimand. Other critics warned women would exploit the
law for retaliation or revenge.s1
Politicians also cited the potential criminalization of innocent
social overtures. At least one MK feared the law would punish helpless
men suffering from involuntary eye spasms or uncontrollable winking
that could be misconstrued as unwelcome harassment.82 Other concerns
involved fear of overloaded court dockets, misuse of the law and of
turning into "America," where "men are afraid to so much as
compliment a co-worker on her dress for fear of getting sacked or
prosecuted."
83
The campaign successfully addressed these concerns and resulted in
a large majority vote in the Knesset. Efforts to gain support for the law
also provided a rare public education opportunity. Such success can be
measured from the support of unlikely candidates. For example, the
initially reluctant orthodox MK Binyamin Elon (Moledet) voted for the
78. MK Tamar Gozinsky (Chadash), one of the law's proposers, emphasized that Israel's
law-unlike other countries-was based not on an equality rationale, but rather, as
the purpose section stated to protect a person's dignity, liberty and privacy. Gozinski
then explicitly links the prevention of sexual harassment law to the values contained
in the Basic Law: Liberty and Dignity. Legislative History, supra note 76, at 9.
79. Dayan (Labor) summarized public sentiments, Legislative History, supra note 1, at 3.
80. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 3.
81. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 3.
82. Rehavam Ze'evi (Moledet) expressed his concern for those who are unable to control
their eyelids and eyebrow movements. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 26.
83. Derfner, supra, note 7, at 17.
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law. In contrast, his fellow party member Rehavam Ze'evi-the lone
dissenter-"filibustered" the Committee discussion with excerpts from
the Song of Solomon, which he claimed would have resulted in sanc-
tions against the biblical King under the new law.
84
In his statement to the Committee during the second reading, MK
Elon (Moledet) summarized the sentiments of many:
I think that we are helping to create a norm of mutual re-
spect.... It is unacceptable to have a cultural style that treats
women as sexual objects [when they reject such advances].
[The law] is logical, it is respectful and it is Jewish. I will sup-
port this law because it is a law on human dignity."5
That principle reconciled effortlessly with halakahic norms of
modesty and protection of women's chastity.86 In the context of sexual
harassment, the orthodox view of women's "chastity" and feminist views
of equality and independence for women, which often represent polar
opposites, worked in tandem to gather support for the legislation. The
common view that women should be sheltered from vulgar harassment
diverged on the reason why such protection was needed. While femi-
nists argue that such treatment erodes human dignity, the orthodox
view demands protection against conduct that undermines women's
chastity.
But perhaps most striking was then Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahu's declaration upon presenting the bill to the milieu:
In the matters of women there is no Left and no Right and no
considerations of government against opposition .... MKs
and ministers acted together as one because there is only one
opposition to this bill: the opponents to this bill are ... em-
ployers who threaten to fire a worker if she becomes pregnant;
and the entities which discriminate in wages. Against all of
them we stand as one coalition.87
Though he painted an exaggerated picture of solidarity, the Prime
Minister's comment, delivered on International Women's Day, reflected
84. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 23.
85. Legislative History, supra note 1.
86. Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism, 35 CoLuivm. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 271,321 (1997).
87. Liat Collins, Knesset Voices support for Women's Issues, JERUSALE M POST, Mar. 11,
1998, at 4.
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the little recognized, yet tremendously effective campaign that gathered
the requisite non-partisan support.
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In order to gain a fuller appreciation for the radical transformation,
one must trace the legislative developments starting with the 1988 EEO
law and on through the various revisions of the 1998 PSH law. The res-
ervations and discussions in the parliament that accompanied the
changes paralleled many of the public qualms about the sweep of the
evolving new standards. As such the revisions and comments reflect a
process of consensus building rooted in a new theoretical understating
of the phenomenon and the necessary tools needed to combat it.
In March 1997, prompted by findings of widespread sexual har-
assment, particularly in the workplace, MKs from the Committee on
the Status of Women ("CSW"), women's rights groups"8 and feminist
legal scholars"9 submitted a legislative proposal on the prevention of sex-
ual harassment. All eight women parliament members of the 14th
Knessee ° joined to sponsor the draft for the requisite three readings in
the Committee on Constitution, Law and Justice ("CLJ") prior to a
Knesset vote.91
The original proposal, titled "Prohibition on sexual harassment
through exploitation of authority or dependency relations, including by
service providers, educators, etc.-1996," was broadened by the CSW
to cover a wider range of contexts and situations in which the phe-
nomenon prevails.92 Accordingly, the expanded bill's tide became "Law
88. Two women's advocacy groups were particularly influential. The Israel Women's
Network, who operates an employment discrimination hotline through which the
scope of the harassment and the lack of effective legal recourse and Na'amat, an ad-
vocacy group for working women.
89. Dr. Orit Kamir of Hebrew University's Law Faculty has authored the seminal theo-
retical articles leading to the proposal, and later led the efforts to broaden the scope of
the legislation. Prof. Kamir cites American law professor Catharine MacKinnon as a
main influence in her thinking about sexual harassment, MacKinnon also served as an
advisor during the process of drafting the proposal. Kamir, supra note 26.
90. The MKs included: Yael Dayan (Labor; Chair, CSW); Dalya Itzik (Labor), Naomi
Blumenthal (Likud-Tzomet-Gesher), Sophia Landver (Labor), Marina Solotkin
(Yisrael Ba'aliya), Tamar Gozinski (Hadash-Balad), Naomi Hazan (Meretz) and Anat
Maor (Meretz). Minister of Communications, Limor Livnat (Likud), did not cospon-
sor the bill because as a cabinet member she may not sponsor a private proposal.
91. Kamir, supra note 26, at 379.
92. Kamir, supra note 26, at 379.
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for the Prevention of Sexual Harassment-1997." 93 A stormy first
reading resulted in approval on November 29, 1997, followed by a fa-
vorable 18 to 1 vote in the second and third readings on March 19,
1998.9' The law became effective on September 20, 1998.
The final version adopted in 1998 represents a revolutionary con-
ceptual and legal understanding of sexual harassment and is light years
away from the narrow bill proposed in 1986 (codified as the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Law-1988), which contained the first and only
explicit reference to sexual harassment in Israeli law.
A. Revising the EEO: A Broader Definition
Within the Labor Context
In 1986, one of the first comprehensive government-sponsored
studies of the prevalence of sexual harassment in the civil service yielded
some alarming figures. More than a third of the surveyed women re-
ported unwelcome verbal comments of a sexual nature as well as
unwanted physical contact.9'
That same year, four proposed revisions to the EEO law were sub-
mitted to the CJ Committee." All four advocated a broad definition of
sexual harassment in the workplace. The CLJ Committee members, its
counsel and observers voiced their support and commitment to the pre-
vention and eradication of the phenomenon.97
Nonetheless, the final draft of proposed revisions embodied only a
narrow vision of sexual harassment.9s As stated by the law, sexual har-
assment amounted to a criminal violation only if: 1) the harasser was an
employer or supervisor; 2) the advancements were refused or rejected;
and 3) the targeted person's job-related rights were harmed as a conse-
quence of the harassment (such rights include, hiring, work conditions,
promotion, training and development, and job security). 99
93. Kamir, supra note 26, at 379.
94. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 49.
95. IWN-SH, supra note 4, citing the Status of Women, No.16, Nov. 1987, Publication
of the Office of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Status of Women. See supra
note 9.
96. Kamir, supra note 26. Of the legislative proposals, three were private, and one sub-
mitted by the parliament.
97. Kamir, supra note 26, at 363.
98. Kamir, supra note 26.
99. Equal Employment Opportunity Law, as amended, 1988 S.H.
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The adoption of a narrow definition reflected the legislators' in-
ability to perceive sexual harassment as an issue of equality and
discrimination. Advocates for a broader-based prohibition, against both
the actual phenomenon and the adverse consequences related to the
workplace, shifted their attention to new theoretical grounds and began
to develop new strategies.
B. Sexual Harassment in New Contexts: A New Approach
Drafters of the proposal adopted a new approach to sexual harass-
ment-one in which the theoretical underpinnings of the prohibition
against sexual harassment included fundamental constitutional tenets
such as respect for human dignity, liberty and equality. While the law
places special emphasis on harassment in the sphere of labor and ex-
ploitation of authority, it applies in a myriad of contexts. Instead of
proscribing the behavior only in particular contexts, the law sports eight
specific definitions of behaviors that constitute sexual harassment.'00
100. Article 3 provides:
(a) Each of the following acts constitutes sexual harassment:
(1) blackmail by way of threats, as defined in section 428 of the Penal Law,
where the act demanded to be performed... is of a sexual character;
(2) indecent acts, as defined in sections 348 and 349 of the Penal Law;
(3) repeated propositions of a sexual character to a person, where that person
has shown to the harasser that he is not interested in the said proposi-
tions;
(4) repeated references directed toward a person, which focus on his sexual-
ity, where that person has shown to the harasser that he is not interested
in the said references;
(5) an intimidating or humiliating reference directed towards a person con-
cerning his sex, or his sexuality, including his sexual orientation;
(6) propositions or references as described in paragraphs (3) or (4), directed
towards one of those enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (c), ... even where
the person harassed has not shown the harasser that he is not interested in
the said propositions or references:
(a) a minor or a helpless person, where a relationship of authority, de-
pendence, education or treatment is being exploited;
(b) a patient undergoing mental or medical treatment, where a relation-
ship of authority between the patient and the person treating him is
being exploited;
(c) an employee in the labour relations sphere and a person in service,
within the framework of such service, where a position of authority
in a work relationship or in service is being exploited.
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Proscribed acts include physical contact, threat of retaliation for
refusing sexual contact, repeated sexual propositions or references to the
person's sexuality where the target communicates that this is unwel-
come, and humiliating denigrating expressions relating to a person's sex,
sexuality, or sexual tendencies.' The list built on acts already pro-
scribed in the Penal Code and set up a clear and concise guide for the
public and the legal establishment differentiating criminal conduct (i.e.
sexual harassment) from acceptable behavior.02
Many important institutional structures fall under the reach of the
proposal: adult educational and vocational institutions, the security
forces (including the military (the IDF),03 the police, prison authorities
and other security organizations) and human resources placement cen-
ters."0 Moreover, each of these institutions, in addition to all employers
with twenty-five or more workers, must publish a "code of practice"
(guidelines) that includes the law's definitions of sexual harassment and
retaliatory conduct, as well as available grievance and investigation pro-
cedures.' °5 Failure to promulgate such guidelines, based on the model
guidelines released by the CSW, would result in fines and penalties for
every week of delay in compliance.0 6 This marks a significant departure
from the 1988 EEO law that failed to require such guidelines. The new
provision, however, could still duplicate prior situations in which em-
ployers who elected to institute a "code of practice" in their workplace
escaped liability because of the existence of guidelines.' That is, the
(d) Prejudicial treatment is any harmful act, the source of which is sex-
ual harassment or a complaint or court action filed in relation to
sexual harassment.
Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 1998, 1992-1998 [hereinafter PSH-1998].
101. Joel Golovensky, An Assault on Sexual Harassment, HA'AIUzr, Nov. 27, 1998,
http://www3.haaretz.co.il/englscri...ent&mador=19&se-true&datee=2/26/99.
102. Of course, by legislating specific proscribed acts in a rigid list, lawmakers compro-
mised the future flexibility needed for unforeseen behaviors that may not fall under
the existing criteria.
103. Since for most Israelis service in the military is mandatory, lawmakers took great care
to include the security forces under the law's purview. For many young Israelis their
military service is their first "real world" experience of an "employment type" rela-
tionship. The experience is invaluable in contributing to the formation of their self
image. Thus, sexual harassment in the military carries strong ramifications for impres-
sionable youngsters, especially within a military structure known for its particularly
sexist stance. See Kamir, supra note 26, at 378-9.
104. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 2.
105. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 7.
106. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 8.
107. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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defense of compliance with procedural guidelines remains a viable claim
of impunity for employers.
As under the previous regime, the Labor courts retain exclusive ju-
risdiction over sexual harassment suits. Civil remedies permit NIS
50,000.. absent proof of damages flowing from the harassment.' Re-
quest for greater sums requires that the petitioner document her
suffering. If employers disregard complaints about harassment, they can
be held liable for up to NIS 50,000 in damages. Employers, however,
are not subject to criminal penalties of imprisonment."0 Criminal sanc-
tions for harassers range from two to four years imprisonment
depending on the severity and repetition of the offensive conduct, and
the harm caused to the person subject to the harassment."'
C. Areas of Contention-the Debate in Committee
During the second and third readings, nearly all of the reservations
to the proposal were dropped prior to the final vote, at the request of
the CSW chairwoman Dayan (Labor)." 2 The only reservation ulti-
mately adopted expanded the duty to promulgate sexual harassment
prevention regulations to institutions of higher education, including
professional and vocational schools." 3 Nonetheless, some areas proved
contentious to the Committee members. For example, the affirmative
duty of those harassed to refuse advances as a safety latch against frivo-
lous or vindictive complaints proved an important issue. Also, the
inclusion of sexual orientation as one of the protected grounds from
harassment sparked a lively debate led by MKs from Moledet, the re-
ligious, pro-settler party."'
108. Upon recommendation of the Justice Ministry advisors, undocumented damages was
reduced from the originally proposed NIS 100,000. Legislative History, supra note 1,
at 7.
109. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 6.
110. Allison Kaplan Sommer, When "Being Friendly" is Breaking the Law, JERUSALm
PosT, Aug. 21, 1998, at 17.
111. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 5.
112. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 37.
113. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 45. Reservation accepted by a 17 to I vote.
114. See infra Section 1V.C.2.
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1. The Responsibility of the Person Harassed
While agency responsibility for preventing sexual harassment con-
stitutes a focus for the law, the core assumption of the law is that the
sexual propositions are repeated, and the person harassed demonstrates
her disapproval"' That is, the harassed women share in the responsibil-
ity; they must "show that they are uninterested in propositions or
references of a sexual nature."" 6 The attribution of responsibility to the
"victim" became an important selling point for the law. The fact that
those harassed would have an affirmative duty to put their harassers "on
notice" alleviated fears that the law would sanction men who were un-
aware of the effect of their conduct, or that women would employ the
law as a vindictive tool for retaliation."
7
MK Anat Maor, of the progressive Meretz party, took issue with
the exceptions to that requirement."' Various individuals are excused
from having to affirmatively refuse sexual harassment. This waiver ap-
plies to minors, "helpless persons," medical or mental patients,
employees and people in the security services."9 MK Maor's objection
derived from a feminist, rather than a sexist perspective intended to ex-
cuse men for their "ignorance" of the impact of indecent propositions
and comments. Maor sought to strike the waiver for repeated refusals of
harassment by employees. She argued that equating women (the pre-
dominant group the law seeks to protect) with minors, the helpless and
the mentally ill robs women of their equal and independent status in
society.
Accordingly, Maor advocated that adult women employees, as re-
sponsible, autonomous persons, should have the responsibility to notify
their harassers that such conduct is unacceptable to them. °20 Anything
short of repeal of the waiver for employees, she warned, would result in
a regression in equality, as well as open the law to abuse.'2 ' However, in
order not to stall the law in Committee, MK Maor withdrew the reser-
vation from the final vote on the bill.' 22
115. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 5.
116. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art 3,
117. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 22. Ze'evi (Moledet) cited the America experi-
ence to warn against revenge-motivated suits.
118. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 17.
119. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 3(a)(6).
120. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 17-18.
121. Legislative History, supra note 76, at 17.
122. For a critique of the waiver requirement, see infra notes 201-07 and accompanying
text.
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2. Sexual Orientation as a Protected Ground
Article 3(a) (5) prohibits "intimidating or humiliating references di-
rected toward a person concerning his/her sex, or sexuality, including
sexual tendencies. ' ' As interpreted by the drafters, the law would bar
mistreatment based on the person's gender, level of sexual activity, or
sexual tendencies (orientation), regardless of whether the characteriza-
tion is true or not.' Sexual harassment is then proscribed regardless of
whether the sexuality prescribed to the person harassed or the harasser is
heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual.'
25
Several MKs, and in particular ones from the conservative Zionist
Moledet party and ultra-orthodox Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians),'26
voiced strong opposition to the inclusion of the phrase "sexual orienta-
tion" or "tendencies" as one of the proscribed grounds for harassment.
The contentious debate, however, must be placed in the broader Israeli
context, where secular and religious voices clash repeatedly on the issue
of homosexuality.
While the issue of homosexuality is still controversial in Israel, both
civil and military institutions have either laws or regulations barring dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The 1988 EEO law
prohibited discrimination against employees on the basis of sexual ori-
entation. 2 In 1994, Israeli lawmakers enacted one of the world's most
liberal policies on the service of gays in the military. 28 Unlike the U.S.
military's policy of exclusion of self-professed homosexuals, the official
Israeli military policy prohibits discrimination against homosexuals,
123. PSH-1998, supra note 100. The tentative English translation used the term "sexual
tendencies." It is quite likely the phrase "sexual orientation" would be synonymous in
this context.
124. Kamir, supra note 26, at 382.
125. Kamir, supra note 26, at 382.
126. Shas, the religious party representing Sephardic Jews, (descendants of Jews originally
expelled from Spain and Portugal before the Inquisition) has an ultra-orthodox lead-
ership, but unlike Haredi society in general, it does not reject Israel's lack of
religiosity. Many of its leaders and supporters served in the army, thus setting Shas
apart from other ultra-orthodox groups, whose exemption from the army service in-
firiates most Israelis. Moledet, the pro-settler party, has ultra-religious inclinations.
See supra note 2.
127. Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 1988, S.H. Provision (3)(a)(5).
128. Emily Bazelon, Gay Soldiers Leave Their Uniforms in the Closet, JERUSALEM POST,
Mar. 16, 1994, at 7.
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from the point of induction, through posting, promotion and to retire-
ment.
129
Even more far reaching, some Israeli laws and policies extend equal
treatment to partners of homosexuals. Partners of employees in the pri-
vate sector, and the civil service, including the security forces, receive the
same pension rights as unmarried heterosexual partners.'3° In a 1994
landmark gay rights case, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that El Al, the
national air-carrier, must provide comparable benefits to partners of gay
employees.' 3 '
A 1997 precedent expanded the doctrine of "equal rights to gay
couples" in private contracts between companies and individuals to ap-
ply equal monetary treatment applicable to the entire public sector. 32
Adir Steiner, a longtime companion of Colonel Doron Maisel who died
of cancer, sought and won the right to receive the same benefits to
which other IDF widowers are entitled;'33 one such benefit is the part-
ner's right to pension payments. Since the public Treasury issues the
pensions, the court's holding extended to partners of all public sector
employees, including soldiers, police officers and teachers.'
Yet, reactions over a recent Supreme Court decision permitting the
national channel's broadcasting of a program on gay teenagers reflect
the divides in Israel over the issue of homosexuality. The traditionally
liberal Court authorized the broadcast over the objections of the
129. Homosexuality may not be used to lower a soldier's induction profile which deter-
mines a soldier's eligibility for elite assignments or influences the soldier's placements
or promotions. The 1994 law replaced a 1983 IDF directive that limited gays' as-
signments and banned them from top security positions. Bazelon, supra note 128, at
7.
130. Moshe Reinfeld, Partners of the Same Sex To Get State Pensions, -A'REaurz, Mar. 31,
1998,
http://www3.haaretz.co.il/engtscri.. .exual/&mador=&se=true&datee=2/25199
(citing statement by the Civil Service Commission).
131. "In a decision hailed as a victory by gays and assailed by rabbis, the court upheld the
petition of El Al flight attendant Jonathan Danilovitz, who fought a five-year court
battle to force Israel's national carrier to honor his request for an annual complimen-
tary flight with his partner." Israeli Court Rules in Gay Couples' [sic] Favor, LA.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at Al0.
132. Esther Hecht, Ruling Against IDF Sets Gay Rights Precedent, JERUSALEM PosT, Jan.
13, 1997, at 3.
133. Even more significant for grieving IDF widowers were the non-monetary benefits:
They were granted the right to be invited to memorial ceremonies and allowed to
write an entry in the IDF's memorial volumes in memory of their loved ones. Hecht,
supra note 132.
134. Adir Steiner, the partner of the late Colonel Doron Meisel, successfully challenged
IDF policies which denied him his partner's pension benefits. Hecht, supra note 132.
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Minister of Education, Zevulun Hammer."5 Hammer, a member of the
National Religions Party, asserted that he opposed the program because
it "ignored social values and encouraged homosexual experimentation
by creating the expectation of a positive experience." 36 While civil rights
organizations hailed the decision, Deputy Minister of Health Rabbi
Shlomo Benziri unleashed harsh comments. Benziri, a Shas (Sephardic
Torah Guardians) member, called the decision a "poverty certificate for
the High Court which is already lacking in spirituality and Judaism,
Jewish ethics and values ... [because of the Supreme Court] restraints
have been lifted and the perversion has been allowed." 137
Yet several months later, the Chairmen of the CLJ committee, MK
Hannan Porat, also of the National Religious Party, suggested that a
form of contractual relationship for homosexual couples should be al-
lowed since they already receive economic privileges as couples.' Most
notably, Porat and Hammer, who share a political party membership,
diverged on the contentious issue of gay and lesbian rights. Such social
and ideological divisions within the religious parties reflect the ambiva-
lent and polemical nature of the debate surrounding the issue. Secular
politicians, likewise, are not immune to splintering views about homo-
sexuality. When the secular President Ezer Weizman made an offensive
comment about homosexuality,'39 the public uproar resulted in a retrac-
tion and an apology.
Orthodox Judaism's condemnation of homosexuality and the real-
ity of a liberal secular Jewish state commingled in the drafting of the law
and the debate over the inclusion of the provision. Attempting to pre-
empt controversy, the drafters proclaimed that "the law does not
purport to enforce sexual morals or to intervene in consensual social
relations, but rather to prevent a person from forcing himself on those
who are not interested in such attention." 40 Whereas drafters attempted
135. Moshe Reinfeld, High Court Backs Broadcast of Gay TVProgram, HA'tmvTz, Sept. 27,
1997, http://www3.haaretz.co.illeng/scri.. .ality+mador=1+se=true+datee=2/5/99.
136. Reinfeld, supra note 135.
137. Reinfeld, supra note 135.
138. Shahar Ilan, Civil 'Marriage' Gets Another Small Boost, WA'Ra=, Aug. 14, 1998,
http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/scri.. .exual&mador=1 &se=true&datee=2/5/99.
139. President Weizman advocated for legal measures to treat "this negative phenome-
non," and declared: "I like it when a man wants to be a man and a woman behaves
like a woman." Leslie Susser, Who Needs a President Anyway? JERUSALEM REroRT,
Feb. 14, 2000, at 12.
140. Preamble, Legislative Proposal, supra note 67, at 484. (emphasis added).
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to focus on the "prohibited conduct," however, the disapproving MKs
questioned the basis for invoking such conduct.1
4 1
MK Alon (Moledet) ruled that the prohibition of "humiliating or
degrading treatment concerning a person's sex, sexuality or sexual ori-
entation" is not directly relevant to sexual harassment.4 2 Rather, Alon
argued, such behavior should fall under general prohibitions against
degrading treatment of people. 43 MK Yitzak Vaknin (Shas) and MK
Rabbi Moshe Gafni (United Torah Judaism) joined their ultra orthodox
colleague in expressing awe at the "relevance of sexual tendency" to a
law about sexual harassment.
Interestingly, while the subtext was clear, 4 4 neither MK publicly
aired any condemnations against homosexuality. Instead, the three MKs
excused their reservation to strike the article as based on the "over-
inclusive nature" of the law as it was phrased.4 5 MK Ze'evi refused to
strike the reservation from the final vote and the Committee voted 14 to
3 to allow sexual orientation as a prohibited ground for sexual harass-
ment. The final version of the 1998 PSH law includes the clause. 6
V. AN INNOVATIVE NEw LAW
The new legislation carries widespread ramifications on legal, social
and political dimensions. Several features set the law apart from similar
legislation worldwide. The broad scope was designed to revolutionize
the social outlook about women and equality. Starting from the view
that sexual harassment does injustice to human dignity and limits the
economic and social opportunities available, particularly to women,
lawmakers wished to account for all non-domestic relations. Accord-
ingly, the law forbids sexual harassment in schools, in the military, on
the street, in hospitals, prisons, in the police force and in shopping
malls. The law also forbids sexual harassment in an inexhaustive cata-
logue of possible configurations: teachers may not harass students;
141. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 19.
142. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 19.
143. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 20.
144. At some point MK Dayan impatiently blurted to Vaknin (Shas): "In my opinion, you
don't accept the provision because the words "sexual tendencies" press some hot
buttons." Vaknin, dissembling innocence, answered "True. [But w]hat does that have
to do with anything?" Legislative History, supra note 1, at 35.
145. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 35.
146. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 3(a)(5).
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shoppers have the right not to be harassed by the proprietor; and Ser-
geants must respect both their civilian and active duty secretaries. 147
The law grants explicit protection to all men and women, whether
heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual." 8 Protected by affirmative legisla-
tion, gays, lesbian and bisexuals may claim damages and redress for
sexual harassment in their workplace, university, hospital, or even the
local grocery store.
Touted as one of the most "user-friendly" sexual harassment laws
worldwide, the Israeli legislation spells out exactly what behaviors con-
stitutes harassment. With eight clear definitions, the law aims to provide
guidance to those who claim ignorance of what is offensive, to targets of
sexual harassment, and to the enforcers and adjudicators of the law. The
supplemental government guidelines, approved August 5, 1998, further
clarify the prohibited behavior; definitions include sexual blackmail at
the threat of termination, unwelcome touching or exposure, repeated
sexual invitations, repeated references to sexuality (when it is made clear
they are undesired), and deprecatory remarks about an individual's sex
or sexual orientation, regardless of the reception.' 9
Another feature designed to reduce the inherent ambiguity in the
nature of sexual relations claimed by the critics, is a demand that the
subject of the harassment make it as clear as possible that she or he is
not interested in the advances or comments. 50 An exception to the rule
applies to situations where the harasser has direct authority over the per-
son harassed. Under such circumstances, the behavior would be
considered harassment, regardless of whether the subject of the unwel-
come attention voiced her disapproval. The rationale for the exception
encompasses situations where complaints or attempts to rebuff the un-
wanted conduct would likely result in termination from a position or
institution. 5'
The law defines a broad agency responsibility over actors who
engage in sexual harassment. Adult educational and vocational
institutions, Israeli security forces, and all employers with 25 or more
workers must post sexual harassment guidelines and facilitate an
147. Israel New Sexual Harassment Law, OFF OUR BACKS, June 1998, http://
www3.xls.com/cgi-bin/csisuite.exe.
148. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 3; see also supra notes 123-126 and accompanying
text.
149. Sommer, supra note 110.
150. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 3. For a discussion of the relevant exceptions, see
supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
151. The two most common situations cited as indicative of the need for the exception are
professor-student or direct employer-employee relationships. IWN-SH, supra note 4.
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adequate grievance procedure, including an efficient investigation
mechanism. 15 2 While the agency is exempt from criminal charges, it is
subject to fines and payment of damages for failure to institute an
approved procedure.'53
Lawmakers eliminated any explicit mention of a sphere (e.g. labor
relations), or a framework (e.g. quid pro quo versus hostile environ-
ment), in which sexual harassment must operate to be considered
offensive. Although relations of authority, such as between employer-
employee and instructor-student received special emphasis, the law re-
jects any confinement to a particular context or circumstance. Adopting
a multi-area approach, the law draws upon and combines labor, crimi-
nal, civil and tort laws.
VI. A BRIEF COMPARISON TO SEXuAL
HARASSMENT LAW IN THE U.S.
In contrast to American jurisprudence, legal system and culture,
the Israeli legal system relies less on the common law approach and
more on a hybrid of civil law emphasis on statuary schemes, with the
occasional ground breaking or precedential case. Consequently, law-
makers do not shy away from legislating statutory parameters to protect,
or bolster, the rights of women and other groups.
In the area of women's rights, as the sexual harassment law was
originally conceived to protect, Israel co-opted the legal scholarship and
jurisprudence that has developed in the United States since the 1970's.
Yet Israeli legislators, unlike their American counterparts, were more
comfortable granting women specified statutory rights.
5 4
The early version of the Israeli 1988 EEO law closely resembled
the scope and structure of the American Tide VII prohibitions against
sexual harassment in the sphere of employment. By virtue of placing
sexual harassment laws in the context of labor law, Israeli lawmakers
reflected a strong American legal doctrinal influence.'55 The new PSH
law, however, marks a sharp departure from American statutory
152. See PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 7, 8. According to the Supplemental Govern-
ment Regulations, failure to complete an investigation without delay must be
accompanied by a written explanation for the delay.
153. Neglect to promulgate the guidelines which must be approved by the CSR and Min-
istry of Justice, results in fines and penalties for every week of delay in compliance.
PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 8.
154. Kamir, supra note 26.
155. Kamir, supra note 26.
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prohibitions, as well as unresolved issues pending before U.S. federal
courts. Sexual harassment prohibitions in Israel are no longer tied to a
specified context, such as the workplace, but to every facet of public life.
Additionally, the law covers men and women of any sexual orientation,
whether as harassers or as targets of harassment.
Sexual harassment prohibitions in the United States center around
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which includes Tide VII, the subsequent
regulations by the EEOC,156 and interpretive case law. Title VII prohib-
its discrimination in the conditions or terms of employment based on
sex.5 By referring to EEOC guidelines, the U.S. Supreme Court con-
cluded that Tide VII barred both quid pro quo propositions that
conditioned employment on the granting of sexual favors and the crea-
tion of an offensive or hostile work environment.158
The Israeli law dispensed with the distinction between quid pro
quo and hostile working environment. Nevertheless, at least one MK,
Tamar Gozinski (Chadash), interpreted Article 3(a)(5), which prohibits
deprecatory treatment directed at a person because of her sex, sexuality
or sexual orientation, to refer to the creation of a hostile work environ-
ment. '59 The inclusion of the article presented a significant reform of
previous laws, as it refers in the abstract to what American courts con-
sider a hostile environment, and what Israeli courts have not previously
accepted.
60
156. The EEOC is the administrative body delegated authority to enforce Tide VII. See
29 C.F.R. § 1601.1 (1996) (establishing EEOC civil right enforcement procedures).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1994). The statute provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawfil employment practice for an employer-(l) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion or sex, or national origin.
Note the similarity of the linguistic structure and conceptual underpinning to
the Israel's EEO-1988, supra note 29-30 and accompanying text.
158., Melissa Manaugh Feldmeier, Comment, Filling the Gaps: A Comprehensive Review of
the Debate Over Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 861, 865 (1997).
The definitive case on sexual harassment under Tide VII is Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (interpreting Tide VII to prohibit unwelcome sexual ad-
vances that create an offensive or hostile workplace and quid pro quo sexual
harassment when an employer conditions employment on the granting of sexual fa-
vors).
159. Legislative History, supra note 1, at 9-10.
160. But contrast the Israeli Supreme Court decision handed down one day before the
bill's second and third reading adopting Gozinski's approach by including harassment
based on "hostile environment." Justice Zamir wrote for the court: "[Eixpressions of
a crude sexual nature indude such expressions that may tangibly and adversely affect
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While drafters declined to adopt the American distinction between
hostile environment and quid pro quo harassment, they sanctioned the
types of behaviors American courts have specified as sexual harass-
ment.16 The law not only details the proscribed behavior, but also
outlines the appropriate response expected by the person harassed in
order to establish a complaint.' Targets of harassment, notwithstand-
ing the proscribed exceptions, must indicate to the perpetrators that
their sexual advances, propositions, or references are unwanted. Thus,
by definition such behavior must be repeated in order to count as sexual
harassment.1
6 3
In contrast harassment within hierarchical frameworks, such as the
workplace or in military service, carries no requirement for repeated
offenses. In addition, Israeli employers of 25 or more employees, bear
significant responsibility to take all reasonable steps to eradicate and pre-
vent sexual harassment.' 6' Similarly, recent U.S. cases suggest that
employers should anticipate misconduct and take action to prevent it.
In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that employers who fail to
act aggressively to uproot sexual harassment may be held liable for the
actions of managers, even when superiors are never put on notice of the
ongoing harassment. 65 As will be discussed in Section VIII, this ap-
proach raises some important issues of responsibility, foreseeability and
privacy.
The Israeli law also rejects the notion of the reasonable person in
assessing hostile work environment-type claims. Instead, the law stipu-
lates that the person harassed must notify her harasser that such
behavior is unacceptable or unwelcome. That requirement fulfills both
the objective and subjective prongs of the traditional American reason-
able person test. Under that test, a claimant trying to prove the existence
of a hostile work environment must demonstrate that the conduct was
the work or educational environment, or undermine the ability to function appropri-
ately within that environment. As to the subject of harassment, verbal harassment
could be directed toward an individual or be circumstantial, designed to create a cer-
tain environment." Legislative History, supra note 1, at 9 (quoting Israel v. Ben Esher,
decision issued March 9, 1998).
161. Kamir, supra note 26.
162. See PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 3; see also supra notes 115-117 and accompa-
nying text.
163. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 3; see also supra notes 115-117 and accompanying
text.
164. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 7.
165. Frances Stead Sellers, A History: Harassment and the Law, THE WAsH. PosT, Feb. 28,
1999, at B4 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Bur-
lington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively "hostile or abusive
environment." 166 Secondly, the subjective prong requires that the target
actually deem the environment as hostile. Since, under the Israeli law,
the harasser or employer are put on notice by the person harassed, that
notice fulfills the objective hostile environment prong. In addition,
since the employee must communicate that the conduct is unwelcome,
she at least subjectively believes that the environment is hostile.
In shedding the reasonableness test, Israeli drafters internalized the
critique of the "reasonable person" in its various permutations, includ-
ing as the "reasonable woman," or the "reasonable victim."' 67 Professor
Kamir, a forceful influence in the drafting of the law, outlined three
main reasons for the rejection of the "reasonable person" test. First,
Professor Kamir renounces the notion of the monolithic definition
which precludes particularistic and diverse interpretation of what con-
stitutes "reasonable." Second, by utilizing the standard, the law fails to
innovate and instead reinforces what society perhaps wrongly perceives
as "reasonable" or "desirable." Lastly, the "reasonable person" refers to
the target of the harassment and not the harasser. In other words, laws
that incorporate the reasonable person test fail to examine the reasonable-
ness of the harasser's behavior, but instead, focuses on the victim's
response.16 1 In light of such critique, the Israeli drafters steered clear of any
reference to a standard evaluation of the conduct. Instead they provided
an explicit definition of what behaviors are deemed "unreasonable."
Unlike the American statute and regulations, Article 3 of the Israeli
PSH law lists sexual orientation as one of the protected grounds. Title
VII makes no reference to sexual orientation. According to EEOC
regulations, however, the target of harassment does not have to be of the
opposite sex from the harasser.' 69 Also, the U.S. Supreme Court recently
declared in Onacle v. Sundowner Offihore Services Incorporated that
same-sex harassment violates Title VII protection.70
In the absence of any U.S. legislation prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, including sexual harassment per se,
however, critics fear that the new decision will result in escalating
discrimination against gays and lesbians.' That is, instead of the
166. Richard F. Storrow, Same Sex Sexual Harassment Claims after Onacle: Defining the
Boundaries ofActionable Conduct, 47 AM. U.L. Rav 677, 687 (1998).
167. Kamir, supra note 26.
168. Kamir, supra note 26.
169. United States, Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, (2000) EEOC
Compl. Man. § 615.6(a).
170. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
171. Storrow, supra note 166, at 698 n.96.
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innovative decision affording protection from harassment based on
sexual orientation, it may lead courts to pursue more aggressively suits
against harassment by homosexual rather than by heterosexual
harassers.' 72 The broad language of Article 3 of the Israeli law bypasses
such deficiencies and legalistic loop holes.
Finally, as an anti-discrimination statute, Title VII purports to
protect equal opportunity. The principle of equality forms the founda-
tion of American legal thinking and is a pervasive force within American
society. In contrast, equality never took on similar force in Israel.'73
Consequently, proponents of the bill in Israel capitalized not solely on
sexual harassment as a form of sexual discrimination violative of equal-
ity,17 4 but as a form of degradation to a human being's liberty and
dignity. The latter theoretical foundation strongly resonated with Israeli
politics and society, as one of the tenets enshrined in one of the few Ba-
sic Laws and in Judaic teachings.'
VII. ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS
On September 20, 1998 the new sexual harassment law, including
the institutional guidelines, took effect. By that date, all companies with
25 or more employees had to post the sexual harassment prevention
guidelines as well as evaluate an official mechanism for handling com-
plaints. 76 But even prior to the concrete implementation, the law
garnered reactions ranging from ridicule to thoughtful consideration.
Regardless of its reception, "the legislation represented nothing less than
'a social revolution""77 to feminist groups, conservative politicians, em-
ployers, educators and the common citizen. Regardless of the cynical
banter, the consensus was that the law would be, in the words of then
Justice Minister Tzahi Hanegbi, "a huge step forward in stopping the
phenomenon of sexual harassment, which is a significant problem in
Israel and does damage to the cause of human dignity."
178
172. Storrow, supra note 166, at 698.
173. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
174. In 1986, the United States Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, first
accepted a sexual harassment claim as sex discrimination. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
175. See supra note 73.
176. Sommer, supra note 1 I0,a t 17.
177. Justice Minister Tzahi Hanegbi described the legislation as nothing less than "a social
revolution." Sommer, supra note 110, at 17 (quoting Justice Minister Tzahi
Hanegbi).
178. Sommer, supra note 110, at 17.
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Yet certain doubts linger. Is the law superimposing American po-
litical correctness on a society that prides itself on impolite jokes?
Would the law be successful in curbing incidents and encouraging com-
plaints? Would it become a tool for "blackmail and exploitation" as
feared by MK Ze'evi, the lone dissenter? Can it establish a clear bright-
line rule between "flirting" and "harassment"? Is the law, though gender
neutral, too closely associated with being a "women's problem" and as
such be marginalized? Would employers escape liability by simply pub-
lishing the guidelines? Would the law, like the attempted no-smoking
initiatives in Israel, become the subject of inappropriate jokes itself?
These queries represent only a narrow line of trepidations about the new
law. However, these concerns are some of the most powerful and may
well determine whether the law will be successfully implementated, or
like previous efforts at reforming sexual harassment laws, will become a
dusty dead letter of the law.
A. Institutional andAgency Reception
Though burdened with these concerns, government agencies and
private companies have already taken some important steps. Since the
law passed, the IDF produced both a manual and a mandatory training
film about sexual harassment. While the bill was pending, the military
launched a 24-hour hotline for complaints and distributed regulations
about appropriate behavior.'79 Induced by the new law, the police force,
as employer and enforcer of the law, distributed guidelines and expla-
nation packages to the forces.18° In El Al, Israel's national airline, a
framework designed to deal with sexual harassment closely resembles the
recommended guidelines, though issued four years prior. The manager
of the flight attendants department at El Al commented that "simply
sending out a message that a company takes sexual harassment seriously
immediately changes behavior."
81
Also, the once scarce workshops on sexual harassment held by the
Israeli Management Institute have received a surge of interest. During
the summer of 1998, the Institute drew standing room crowds of high
level managers, human resources personnel and legal advisors from
Israel's top companies for a day-long seminar on the subject.'82 The
179. Rappoport, supra note 14.
180. Sommer, supra note 110, at 17.
181. Sommer, supra note 110, at 17 (paraphrasing the statements of Yola Reitman).
182. Sommer, supra note 110, at 17.
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executives in attendance even requested follow up sessions."' Clearly,
the legislation has achieved one of its purported purposes: to raise
awareness of the problem of sexual harassment-even if motivated by
managerial desire to avoid corporate liability."'
Although the law requires all adult educational (vocational and
professional) institutions to publish similar guidelines, most universities
in Israel will be unaffected by the new legislation. Apart from Bar-Ilan
University, all other accredited universities in Israel have clear proce-
dures for dealing with sexual harassment of students and staff."85 Tel
Aviv University, for example, appointed a special ombudsperson and
adopted a particularly strict code of conduct, which preserves the secrecy
of the complaint.8 6 Even so, few women have mustered the courage to
complain.
The case of the universities illustrates a situation where cultural and
social constraints, such as the lack of trust in the grievance procedure to
yield desirable results, or fear of being ostracized, have a greater impact
than the availability of remedies at law. Proponents argue and hope that
the law would give women a "shot of self-confidence and self-esteem" to
take responsibility and send out a message of what type of behavior in
unacceptable.' In that respect, the legislation is meant as an educa-
tional, consciousness-raising tool designed to reform deep-seated social
perceptions of responsibility and permissible conduct.
B. JudicialAcceptance and Cooperation
The real test of laws is often their treatment by the courts. Judges
often dismiss or dilute the intended impact of certain legislation,
especially laws considered overbroad or over-reaching. In a show of
support a day before the scheduled second and third readings of the bill,
183. Sommer, supra note 110, at 17 (quoting Professor Orit Kamir, who co-facilitated the
workshop at the Institute).
184. Note for example the mixed feelings expressed by the Israel Manufacturers' Associa-
tion, representing about 1,200 industrial firms. A spokesman for the Association
quipped that implementing the new sexual harassment regulation in itself will be a
form of harassment. He further commented that the context-street grocers versus
employees on the 17th floor of an air-conditioned office building-may determine
the true distinction between permissible flirting and sexual harassment. Joseph Gat-
tegno, IMA's head of Labor Relations and Human resources in Derfner, supra note 7,
at 17.
185. The Law and the Limits ofHarassment, supra note 53.
186. The Law and the Limits of Harassment, supra note 53.
187. Sommer, supra note 110 (quoting Professor Kamir).
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the Israeli Supreme Court issued a forty-four page decision on a sexual
harassment case that incorporated the proposed statute into the
common law. The justices not only mentioned the pending legislation,
but drew upon its theoretical underpinnings as well as concrete
definitions of sexual harassment to find in favor of the plaintiff.'88 The
Ministry of Education did not allow the head of the Teachers' College
to dismiss an instructor disciplined for sexual harassment complaints."'9
Reversing the dismissal of the complaint by the Ministry of Education,
the Court elaborated on the concept of sexual harassment, basing many
of the legal rationales against harassment, whether individual or as
contributing to a hostile environment, on the bill pending in the
Knesset. 9 0
Additionally, the Court supported the broad reach of the law. Jus-
tice Zamir agreed that sexual harassment is always inappropriate,
whether in the workplace, in school, or elsewhere in public.' 9' The Jus-
tice concluded that free behavior must reflect the free will of the two
parties involved, thus rendering sexual harassment as always impermis-
sible because it is forced by one person on another against his or her
will. 92 The Justice drew on ideas of sexual harassment as undermining
human dignity, and as such, individual equality.
[Sexual relations], is by definition, an area which more than
any other is reserved for mutual consent. [Sexual harassment]
is inappropriate ... because it relates to a person in an em-
ployment or academic environment on the basis of his
sexuality in a damaging way, in a situation where he should be
related to on the basis of his job or the level of his contribu-
tion.9 3
In contrast to the drafters' reluctance to incorporate a standardized
criteria to judge inappropriate behavior, the Supreme Court adopted a
188. Dayan (Labor) discussing the decision, Israel v. Ben Esher. Legislative History, supra
note 1, at 7.
189. Legislative History, supra note 1.
190. Dayan (Labor) discussing the decision, Israel v. Ben Esher. Legislative History, supra
note 1, at 7.
191. Israelv. Ben Esher, decision issued March 9, 1998. Portions of the decision quoted in
Legislative History, supra note 1, at 28-29 by Naomi Chazan (Meretz). The High
Court panel included Chief Justice Barak, Justice Zamir and Justice Strousburg-
Cohen.
192. Supra note 191.
193. Supra note 191, at 29.
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variation of the "reasonable person test"'94 familiar from American sex-
ual harassment jurisprudence. The objective test to determine sexual
harassment requires that a reasonable person would see the behavior as
causing real harm.'95 However as critics have noted, in the United
States, a "jury of peers" makes that determination, while in Israel the
judge alone is entrusted with that decision. Since the statutory law ex-
plicitly rejects the test in favor of detailed definitions, the decision issued
prior to the promulgation of that law may be transformed into a doc-
trine more closely guided by the law's aims.
Further, the strong presence of female judges in the Labor Courts,
which retain exclusive jurisdiction over sexual harassment matters, may
contribute to a sexual harassment doctrine based more on the "user-
friendly" and accessible statute. Women constitute 40% of Israel's judi-
ciary, with 60% and 25% of women judges in the regional labor courts
and the national labor courts, respectively.' Critics' concerns over the
potential of continued reliance on the "reasonable person" standard may
be relieved by the presence of numerous women on the bench, whose
understanding of "reasonable behavior" as professional women in a male
populated field may be more in sync with the claimants than even a
carefully hand-picked jury.
C. Conflicting Privacy and Liberty Concerns
Sexual harassment suits delve into the intimate details of the lives
of both the target and the perpetrator of the harassment. But even prior
to the grievance or legal proceedings, the PSH law, designed to protect
human dignity and equality against the damage of sexual harassment,
may translate into violations of liberty and privacy rights. This critique,
however, is not meant to reiterate the notion that men will no longer be
free to extend compliments to well-dressed or attractive women, but
rather a deeper notion of conflicting legal and human rights.
The conflict between the Privacy Protection Law and the 1998
PSH law illustrates the tension between protection against sexual
194. Ruti Sinai, American Standard, Israeli Harasser, HA'A1aPEz, March 11, 1998, at 13-1
(in Hebrew) (cautioning against importing American standard of political correctness
into Israeli society, with a different cultural mentality).
195. Sinai, supra note 194.
196. Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Justice, Combined
Initial and Second Report of the State of Israel Concerning the Implementation of
the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) (1997).
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harassment and the right to privacy and freedom. The Privacy Act of
1982 stipulates that employers may not infringe on a worker's privacy
rights.' Accessing an employee's computer to read his e-mails, for
example, would be considered a violation of that law.!"9 The 1998 PSH
law, however, requires employers to take all reasonable steps to prevent
sexual harassment in the workplace.'99 One such step may entail reading
employees' e-mails sent from their work computers in order to monitor
for sexually-harassing messages. Consequently, employers who fail to
monitor electronic messages for offensive material may be held
accountable for sexual harassment. Yet, employers who do monitor may
escape liability for sexual harassment but will be guilty of violating the
statutory privacy rights of their workers.
While the above scenario may be resolved by notifying workers that
their e-mails will be monitored, the conflict between agency or em-
ployer responsibility for a sexual-harassment free environment and their
workers' liberty and privacy rights remains. Striking an appropriate bal-
ance between the competing rights involved will likely require close
coordination and cooperation of different regulatory agencies, the judi-
cial branch and top executives in the private sector.
D. Feminist Pitfalls
Even with its good intentions, the law suffers from several feminist
pitfalls. Whereas the law is gender neutral, the rationale and the
statistics used to persuade MKs and the public of the seriousness of
sexual harassment were based on the disproportionate damage inflicted
on women. The public debate centered around the law and the
phenomenon as a "women's problem," rather than a broad societal
issue.00 One illustrative example is that even though many male MKs
197. Yaacov Yisraeli & Noam Nativ, Is Someone Eavesdropping on Your E-maiP', A1Aaoz Sept.
1, 1998, htp://www3.haaretzco.illengscri...mentlmador=5&se=true&datee=2126199.
198. Yisraeli & Nativ, supra note 197, at 197 (noting that Art. 2, Privacy Protection Act,
1981, dearly states that the law applies to electronically generated and delivered mes-
sages).
199. PSH-1998, supra note 100, at Art. 7(a).
200. Note Dayan (Labor) declared that sexual harassment was not a women's problem,
but rather a social ill. Legislative History, supra note 1.
As presented by the media and groups that supported the law (mostly women's
advocacy groups), however, the message was drowned in the mainstream view of the
bill as specifically protective of women. Similarly, opponents of the bill cited women
motivated by revenge and vindication as potential exploiters of the law. Such criti-
cism builds on the stereotype of the scorned, vindictive woman. Opponents would
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supported the bill, no male MK signed on as a co-sponsor. The query
then becomes why would the liberal supportive male MKs shy away
from having their names identified with the law? Possibly the initial
uproar over the segregation effect that the law would create between the
sexes carried over to the reluctance of male MKs to be in the same
"camp" as the female MKs, all of whom signed on as co-sponsors.
Another feminist peril lies in the exceptions for affirmative respon-
sibility of repeated refusal of unwanted sexual advances or propositions.
Article 3 waives that requirement for minors, mental patients, employ-
ees and persons in (military) service. 21 Drafters offered the compelling
rationale that such persons may lack the capacity or ability to rebuff
unwanted sexual advances or propositions either because of their mental
instability (mental patient), lack of knowledge (minor), or fear that they
might lose their position (employees).
However, as alluded to by MK Maor (Meretz),2 2 since the law was
designed to predominantly protect women, the gender-neutral language
only thinly veils the text's equivocation of minors, the mentally ill, and
the hapless, with women (in subordinate positions). Such comparison is
reminiscent of early 20th century work condition cases in the United
States, in which the courts permitted government regulation of maxi-
mum work hours for "wards of the state," such as minors, children,
lunatics and women.2 3 Men, unlike women, were seen as suijuris, inde-
pendent, fully capable individuals who could contract and make their
own decisions.
M
In a gesture designed to enshrine women's fledgling equality, the
American Supreme Court reversed such cases, reasoning that since the
adoption of the 19th amendment, granting women the right to vote, the
"civil inferiority of women was thus almost at a vanishing point."0 5
have us believe that women, unlike their male counterparts, will falsely claim they
were harassed when abandoned by their lovers, or when bypassed for a promotion or
raise.
201. PSH-1998, supra note 100, atArt. 3 (a)(6).
202. See Legislative History, supra note 1, and accompanying text.
203. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (sustaining an Oregon law limiting
work hours for women only because "woman's physical structure... place[s] her at a
disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence").
204. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
205. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a District of Co-
lumbia law prescribing minimum wages for women as violative of due process).
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The Israeli law's waiver for women employees"' suffers from the
same perceptual pitfalls of the early American cases which relied on
gender stereotypes to justify discriminatory protective measures. A re-
lated concern is that the sexual harassment prevention measures may be
marginalized as special structures dealing primarily with the concerns of
women (and possibly gays) separate and apart from the generally ac-
cepted criminal or civil laws already prohibiting similar behavior. 07
Yet, in counter, the passage of the specific legislation indicated a
problem of non-enforcement or non-compliance with the general
criminal or civil prohibitions in that particular context. The advantage
of the explicit particularistic approach to legislation designed to protect
specific groups lies in its potent educational value. By outlining a spe-
cific context for certain offenses, the public as well as the justice system,
are put on notice of the expected standard of behavior. The approach
allows for vague sanctions to materialize into specific examples of inap-
propriate behavior, clarifying and simplifying pre-existing laws and
evolving norms of social conduct.0 8
CONCLUSION
Truly enlightened to the pervasive reach of sexual harassment,
Israeli women's rights advocacy groups succeeded in passing one of the
most progressive laws in the world. These groups, along with the
Committee for the Status of Women and outspoken MKs, managed to
transform an initially vehemently resistant public and parliament to
active participants in a social revolution designed to combat the adverse
effects of sexual harassment.
A long way has passed from sexual harassment prohibited only in a
subsection of the EEO law, which referred solely to authority relations
206. Note that the exceptions apply equally to male employees. However, the context for
the exception derived from the disparate impact of sexual harassment on women and
as such was designed to protect women in particular.
207. For example, Israeli Penal Code and other laws already prohibits certain acts that fall
under the new sexual harassment law, including extortion, attempted assault, unequal
treatment in the workplace, and violations of human dignity.
208. A possible, though admittedly unlikely, side effect 'of specific legislation designed to
primarily protect women from sexual harassment, may be a reluctance on the part of
employers to hire women, especially "attractive" women who they may fear will be-
come the target of sexual advances. In order to avoid liability, no matter how remote,
employers or top military officials may eschew hiring women (and homosexual) in
lieu of male employees. Conversely, some employers may elect not to fire bad workers
for fear of "retaliatory" sexual harassment suits.
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in the workplace. Today the sexual harassment law covers all public
sphere transactions, protecting anyone regardless of gender or sexual
orientation.
Cleverly, the law covers Israel's most rigid and hierarchical institu-
tions: the security forces, the civil service, and the private sector.
Embracing an interdisciplinary approach, the law combines criminal
and civil penalties in an intersection of civil, labor, criminal and tort
laws.
Possibly the most important ramification of the new law is its pur-
pose to educate, to raise awareness of the problem, and to contribute to
the transformation of accepted norms of behavior. If nothing else,
though much has already transpired, the law has successfuly opened a
healthy discussion about what should be considered acceptable behavior
and what constitutes degrading, deprecatory and disrespectful treat-
ment. Concerns that the law will become a tool for blackmail and
exploitation, that it will have a chilling effect on the relations between
the sexes, were alleviated by the law's two basic premises. First, preven-
tion of sexual harassment was shown to be rooted in protecting the
fundamental dignity and autonomy of the person. Second, the law re-
quires repeated refusals and the assertion of affirmative responsibility by
the target of the harassment to set the limits for what makes them un-
comfortable.
Unlike previous laws that were put to little use, the public discus-
sion and publicity of the law educated people not only about what
behaviors are impermissible, but also about what remedies are available.
Thus, the problem of little relief to the nearly non-existent number of
women informed enough to utilize the law has likely been eliminated.
But of course, the real effects of the law remain to be seen. Ac-
cording to legal and social science experts, at least a decade must pass
before the new law is internalized sufficiently by Israeli society in order
to yield a change in perception of the issues involved.29 By 2000, several
sexual harassment suits were filed as a consequence of the new law, in-
cluding one against a senior official in a major public institution and
one against a religious-Zionist organization.210 One suit was successfully
settled for NIS 50,000 for psychological damaged incurred by a house-
mother in Bnei Akiva, a religious-Zionist youth organization, who
209. Merav Sheri, As Law Takes Efflec Sexul Harassment Remains Low on the Pubic Agenda,
HA'ARETZ, Sept. 16, 1998, www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/scri... ent&mador=1&se=true&datee-
12/24/98.
210. Sexual Harassment Law, THE LEGAL CENTER, http:/Iwww.iwn.org/law/ (last visited
Dec. 19, 2000).
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claimed she was harassed by her supervisor for five years.21' The setde-
ment for psychological damages is unique and seems to be directly
informed by the civil remedies provision of the new PSH law that
stipulates for a maximum of NIS 50,000 for mental harm even absent
proof of actual damages due to the harassment. Yet, with social revolu-,
tions, such as the one attempted by the passage of the 1998 Sexual
Harassment Prevention law, only time can tell their true impact. t
211. Sexual Harassment Law, THE LEGAL CENTER, http://www.iwn.orgllaw/ (last visited
Nov. 9, 2000).
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